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Can there be a Virtue Ethics of Institutions? 
1. Introduction 
Michael Slote has defended an agent based virtue ethics
1
 which ‘treats the moral or ethical 
status of acts as entirely derivative from independent and fundamental aretaic ethical 
characterizations of motives, character traits, or individuals’.2 It is with admirable ambition 
that he has extended the scope of his approach to a conception of democratic social justice 
derived from virtuous motives, including that of appropriately balanced care for one’s 
political society and others
3
, according to which:    
[J]ust as individualistic agent-basing regards individual acts as morally good if they 
reflect morally virtuous motivation and wrong if they reflect vicious or deficient 
motivation, an agent based account of social morality will treat customs, laws and 
institutions as morally good (positively and admirably just) if they reflect virtuous 
(enough) motivations on the part of (enough of) those responsible for them as 
morally bad (or unjust) if they reflect morally bad or deficient motivation.
4
 
I say that Slote’s ambition is ‘admirable’ not least because he seems to me to offer a truly 
virtue-ethical approach to contemporary normative political theory. Whilst it may stretch a 
point to say he is the first to do this, his approach is in this respect certainly a novel one 
which, also, proffers a theory that is interesting in its own right. To see how, we can 
distinguish it from some other contemporary arguments and ideas about virtues and virtue 
ethics in politics. One kind of argument is for certain political structures being most 
conducive to a society’s members flourishing and being virtuous, and another is that there are 
certain politically oriented virtues which individual citizens or members of a society need in 
order to uphold certain political values and structures. For an example of the first kind of 
view, the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse 
5
 responds to the twin spectres 
of anachronism and authoritarianism in virtue ethics’ ancient Platonic and Aristotelian 
genealogy (a worry also recognized by Slote
6) 
by suggesting that a just and virtuous society 
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most conducive to its members living good human lives would necessarily not be morally 
authoritarian, and thus turn out to be most conducive with pluralistic conditions of liberal 
democracy.
7
 As for the second kind of view, political theorists have developed conceptions of 
civic virtues or liberal virtues that are, they argue, necessary for living well in a good or 
liberal society. William Galston, for example, understands ‘the liberal virtues […] 
instrumentally, as means to the preservation of liberal societies and institutions’.8  
What matters for our purposes is not the success or otherwise of these kinds of arguments but 
the way in which Slote’s is different from them and is, I think, more akin to the evaluative 
criteria of virtue ethics per se than either of them is. Slote’s formulation of social justice 
prioritizes neither a set of political conditions, structures or principles that make for virtuous 
persons, nor a certain class of politically virtues which would best facilitate a certain kind of 
society or moral life. Rather, his view roots the justice and ethical admirability of a society 
and its institutions in the motivations and ethical character of individual agents who constitute 
them, and this direction of fit is genuinely faithful not only to agent-basing but also, arguably, 
to the distinctive structure of normative virtue ethics in general, the hallmark of which being 
its (somehow) locating the criterion of rightness or wrongness of acts in the character traits 
and motivations of agents. To this extent, Slote tackles head-on his own (and others’) worry 
that contemporary virtue ethics has lagged behind rival moral theories which can more readily 
‘be systematically applied to both individual moral and political questions’.9Aside from 
advancing virtue ethics’ scope and offering to assuage the internal worry just mentioned, 
Slote’s idea also stands up as a quite radical form of political philosophy. For, arguably, the 
standard work-flow of normative political theory is its formulating and justifying the political 
principles and institutions which are to clothe the individual constituents of a polity, and here 
it is reversed. Slote not only seeks to derive morals, but also the justice and rightness of 
political institutions and societies, purely from motives. 
In this paper I will argue that despite its strengths, the socially and politically extended 
version of agent-based theory defeats itself in attempting to derive the justice and, perhaps, 
the legitimacy
10
 of social structures from individual motives. A plausible account of what 
motivates (and what should motivate) individuals in creating and sustaining institutions 
requires a separate and prior account of those institutions’ purposes or values and the various 
rules, customs, laws, obligations and duties they determine. Agent-basing cannot give such an 
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account, so here it falls short of offering a cogent line in political philosophy. If Slote’s theory 
is essentially virtue ethical, as I have just claimed, then the problem may have implications for 
political versions of virtue ethics per se. I end by considering how far this problem in Slote’s 
account might generalize and threaten to undermine any kind of virtue-ethical project into 
social and political philosophy. I do not think it need do this as long as it understood that 
institutions, and the social structures they define for individuals, are things quite different 
from individual persons, and thus that a variety of virtue ethics that applies to political and 
social institutions rests on formulating a distinctly institutional variety of virtues. 
2. Virtue Ethics, Agent-Basing and Social Justice 
One quite general objection to politics in contemporary virtue ethics appears to have 
particular import for an agent-based version, some discussion of which will help illuminate 
key features of agent-basing. The general objection is that the characteristic concerns and 
scope of political philosophy are not about any agent in particular, still less her particular 
traits and motives, but rather, by definition, about the ways and extent to which large numbers 
of such individuals should or should not stand and be bound in relation to each other and to 
institutions of society and State. These include, for example, the arrangement of social, 
political, legal institutions, the distribution of goods and resources, the role and legitimacy of 
authority and laws that determine which set of constraints individuals in a given society are 
subject to, and why.
11
 By contrast, any virtue ethics’ starting point is the subject of the 
individual and their moral character, where those that give accounts of rightness and 
wrongness of actions do so in terms of the virtues or vices, the traits, motivations and reasons, 
on which the particular agent acts. The general objection is that political philosophy and 
virtue ethics are in an important sense talking about different things: The former speaks about 
supra-individual entities and their relation to individuals; and the latter speaks about the inner 
lives of those individuals.  
A fortiori, given that agent-basing construes the rightness of action directly and entirely from 
inner psychological and affective states of the person acting, the objection to agent-based 
version of virtue ethics is to its apparently inherent difficulty in accounting for legal 
requirements, rules and laws or political constraints or obligations. (As Slote is keen to point 
out, this does not commit agent-basing to the view that an individual’s having a morally 
admirable character is sufficient for all or any of their actions to be right, but the action will 
be right if it exhibits such a morally admirable motive.
12
) So, on the plausible assumption that 
any political theory must recognize the necessity of at least some kinds of normative 
structures in the form of institutions – (e.g. legal institutions) and their requirements and 
constraints (e.g. laws and punitive measures), and that these things are something other than 
the motivational states of particular agents, one might wonder just how agent-basing can 
account for, still less justify, legal and political institutions.
13
 How, then, can only the virtuous 
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motivation of individuals do justice to social and political justice? What exhibits or reflects 
the virtuous (enough) inner motivation of individuals in acts and entities affecting the lives 
and relations between potentially millions of different individuals?   
Consider, firstly, the agent-based theorist’s claim that an action cannot be deemed right unless 
it arises from a virtuous motive. Slote responds to the objection that this renders agent-basing 
implausible as a moral theory,
14
 but in any case this feature of the agent-based view may not 
be especially implausible in the case of large-scale political action. Where such morally 
deficiently motivated military action, for example, has resulted or could have resulted in some 
putatively positive outcome such as the removal of a dictator, some have called it (or may call 
it) ‘the right war for the wrong reasons’. But it is reasonable to suppose that to the extent that 




More pressing, however, seems to be the converse objection, that acting from admirable 
motivations far from guarantees good or right actions, and instead may well often result in 
well-intentioned moral failure. The political twist to the ‘good motives can and do result in 
wrong actions’ objection comes with thinking about the way in which those in high public 
office, and their institutions, are faced with decisions of moral conflict which would not seem 
adequately, justly, rightly resolved in action by merely having a virtuous or virtuous enough 
motivation. In these cases the morally admirable motivations of individuals may appear to 
hamper the right (positively just) or best political action rather than produce it, and we might 
think that those making decisions on matters which affect entire societies need to be be 
dispassionate or especially assiduously objective in doing so. So here the thought is not, 
contra the ‘no right actions from morally deficient motives’ commitment of agent-basing, just 
that motives do not matter in politics as long as the ‘job gets done’. Rather, it is that motives 
matter a lot. In particular the motive towards getting the job done should override motives 
which, in other parts of life, we call virtuous. Given the kinds of decisions over actions that 
politicians face, the primary motivational state appropriate for political acts would seem to be 
something like a teleological concern for doing whatever needs to be done to achieve the 
right, or overall best, outcome. Adopting for the sake of argument a Machiavelli-like stance, a 
primarily consequentialist disposition
16
 might seem a requirement for those in public office 
who may on occasion have to dirty their hands to attain the best overall results in matters of 
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public policy and state.
17
 Insofar as those responsible for political acts and institutions, laws 
etc. need strong motives of care it is that they need to care about getting these results and 
avoiding others, where the primary concerns are the ends of politics (including that of just 
societies) and the best means (policies, acts, laws) by which to realize these ends. In assessing 
whether political actions are right or best, basic or general dispositions of caring are the last 
thing we should look at, if we should look at them at all. 
Slote’s response to the objection that agent-basing is too inward-looking is instructive for his 
formulation of social justice here. He explains that a properly virtuous motive, if genuinely 
held, will direct its possessor to look outwards at the relevant scope of any act which flows 
from that motive: 
 
If one morally judges a certain course of action or decision by reference to, say, the 
benevolence of the motives of its agent, one is judging in relation to an inner factor 
that itself makes reference to and takes account of facts about people in the world. 
One's inward gaze effectively “doubles back” on the world and allows one […] to 
take facts about the world into account in one's attempt to determine what is 
morally acceptable or best to do.
18
 
Bringing this condition to the social and political version of agent-basing, the construction 
and sustenance of institutions, the instituting of laws, declarations, policies and political acts 
will, also, only reflect or exhibit virtuous (enough) motives if those responsible properly 
consider the facts about the world and the people affected by these things. Thus the politician 
who is deciding on acting, sanctioning an act or on voting on a policy, would not be genuinely 
motivated by care for his country (and others) or benevolence if in doing so she failed to do 
her utmost to find and properly consider what effects each decision (or lack of decision or 
abstention) would have.
19
 Slote himself provides an apposite example of the necessity of this 
kind of reflection for acting morally in a political or social role. Taking Sidgwick’s case of the 
prosecutor who fulfils his duty to prosecute but does so from a motive of malice rather than 
that duty, Slote considers what motive would be manifest if the prosecutor failed to fulfil that 
duty, where: ‘one very likely explanation will be that [the prosecutor] lacks real or strong 
concern for doing his job and playing the contributing social role that that involves’.20 
We can glean two important points for agent-based political theory from this example. The 
first point is that agent-basing can accept the reality of obligations and duties that arise from 
social and political institutions without locating a moral criterion somewhere other than 
motives. Following Slote on Sidgwick, agent-basing construes duties and obligations of social 
and political roles as features of the world which the correctly virtuously motivated individual 
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must consider in order to assess what would be the morally right or best action in those roles. 
The prosecutor could not properly be properly evincing a virtuous motive if he shuns his duty, 
precisely because he would be failing to look outwardly and take into account his office of 
prosecutor and what it is that a prosecutor (and not just any agent) is supposed to be doing. 
Similarly, in other cases of acts by political representatives, delegates or public officials, the 
fact that one holds such a role and is bound by its obligations, and those obligations, must 
inform the deliberation of anyone who is properly virtuously motivated to act well. This is 
what we should expect of an agent-based theory, or indeed any kind of virtue ethics that does 
not implausibly deny that there are, as a matter of fact out there in the social world, 
obligations that attach to certain offices and roles.
21
 On any such view there are surely at least 
some actions qua certain kind of professional, or family member, or club-member, the 
rightness or wrongness of which is not adequately assessed without considering those roles 
and their obligations. The second point, to which I turn next, is more problematic for agent-
basing. 
3. Problems for an Agent-based Theory of Social and Political Justice 
While agent-basing on this construal sets socially and politically institutionally determined 
duties and obligations (such as those of the prosecutor) within the proper scope of the virtuous 
motives of individuals, it so far fails to say anything about what those duties and obligations 
should be like. Still less does it tell us about the relevant qualities of the institutions that 
determine those duties and obligations. That is, so far it does not give justificatory grounds for 
duties and obligations such as the prosecutor’s duty to prosecute. Articulating and specifying 
these duties and obligations at various levels of state and society is what social and political 
institutions do (as the legislator’s may be articulated in a political constitution and the 
prosecutor’s duty specified by institutions of law, for example). And crucially, the task of 
normative political philosophy is to formulate and justify such institutions and their 
arrangement together – not only give an account of how individuals can best act in relation to 
them as entities they encounter in the world. Where agent-basing in the individual case sees 
structural political and social phenomena as aspects of the world that virtuously motivated 
individuals need to see and reflect upon, a political theory of social justice seeks to justify 
those phenomena and, to some extent, that world. So agent-basing may get morals, but not yet 
the justice of institutions, from socially and politically reflective motives. 
Slote of course sees that the agent-based view must account for the justness or rightness of 
these structural phenomena and institutions. For, his hope is that agent-basing can evaluate 
‘laws, customs and institutions’ in terms of whether they ‘reflect or exhibit or reflect virtuous 
(enough) motives on behalf of (enough) of those responsible for them.’ How then is this 
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evaluation to be made?  The agent-based view that the rightness or justice of some institution 
– or some law or custom it defines – is the extent to which it reflects or exhibits virtuous 
(enough) motives on the part of (enough) of those responsible for it. In order to exhibit 
virtuous motivation in upholding and sustaining that institution either (enough of) those 
responsible must take into account what that institution requires of them, or the virtuous 
(enough) motivations that instantiate rightness and justice do not take institutional 
requirements into account. The problem is that first option is difficult to reconcile with the 
agent-based view, and the second gives us an implausible, inadequate view of the value 
(rightness and justice) of social and political institutions, or so I will argue next. 
Taking the first part of the disjunction, we cannot see institutional requirements as features of 
the world to which well-motivated individuals need to be attuned, at least not as easily as we 
can in the case of the prosecutor who stands in relation to obligations that come from the role. 
For in evaluating the justice and rightness of legal institutions themselves, we are not 
assessing the motives of individuals as bound by external social, institutional constraints. 
Rather, to reiterate, we are assessing the rightness and justice of the constraints and the 
structures that maintain those constraints. But we cannot make such a move in agent-based 
terms by allowing into the motivational picture prior and non-motive based considerations of 
what makes a certain institution (such as a legal institution) –  and the rules and obligations it 
determines – right or just. We cannot, on that view, say that the legal institution is right and 
just when enough of those responsible for it sustain it from virtuous motives, and add that the 
proper expression or exhibition of such motives will involve considering requirements and 
constraints determined by that legal institution. At least, the agent-based theorist cannot do 
this without positing a conception of legal justice that is prior to or separate from those 
motives, and to do so would be to defeat that theory. 
To illustrate further we can ask how we might intuitively think of how a motivation of 
someone responsible for sustaining legal institutions would be virtuous or morally deficient. 
We might well say that virtuous motivation or its deficiency in this context would involve a 
concern or lack of concern for the values, purposes and practices embodied by that institution. 
These could include a concern that (some conception of) justice is done, that due processes 
are followed, that evidence is subject to proper scrutiny, that no one is punished unless guilt is 
found beyond reasonable doubt, and so on. But the point of agent basing is that derives the 
justice or rightness not on the basis of whether it realizes such institutionally specified 
features but entirely from constituent agents’ virtuous motives. So if it is to derive 
institutional rightness or justice this way then it cannot coherently presuppose the presence 
and normative pull of these institutional features as those from which constitutive virtuous 
individuals’ ‘inner gaze’ should ‘double-back’.  
In order coherently to construe the justice and rightness of a political institution, then, the 
agent-based view must go for the second option, and hold that a certain institution is right or 
just by the extent to which it exhibits or reflects morally virtuous (enough) motives of 
(enough) of those individuals responsible for it, where those individuals’ deliberations are not 
laden with specifically institutional values and considerations.  
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The immediate difficulty with this strategy, hinted at in the penultimate paragraph, is that it is 
entirely plausible that institutionally grouped and constitutive individuals will and should 
consider institutionally determined features in their deliberations. One way to allow this of 
these individuals, whilst keeping the requirement to evaluate an institution from non-
institutionally laden virtuous motives, would be to exercise some licence with the concepts of 
exhibition or reflection. For we could, I think, allow that the way in which an institutional 
collective currently operates and the conventions it embodies could exhibit or reflect a general 
motivation among enough of its members (think here of how we might take this view of a 
collective which we hold to be morally repugnant, such as those of organized crime).  
Following this line, suppose that many individual legal professionals are well motivated by 
benevolence or balanced caring to uphold the institutions of law, where this motivation will 
characteristically, perhaps even essentially, involve their considering the separately and 
institutionally defined aims of their respective professions. Here, the underlying and basic 
motives of care or benevolence could, as it were, shine through when aggregated together in 
exhibition or reflection as the institutional collective. There is nothing metaphysically fishy 
(or quiet possibly nothing metaphysical at all) about motivational features which are tangled 
up with others in individuals but revealed distinctly as such only in collectives. Consider in a 
different context, for example, a strong team spirit the exhibition of which requires only that a 
sufficient number of team-players have a minimal basic commitment to the team’s 
achievement. In each individual this could be bound up with other motivations such as 
personal glory or fame. Nor does conceiving the motivation of the institutional collective in 
this aggregative, emergent, way commit the agent based theory to positing and defending 
distinctly collective agents or collective virtues or motivations.
22
 The motives really are there 
in several (and enough of) the relevant individuals, and the non-institutionally directed and 
basic quality of the motivations can be instructively inferred just when these motives are 
exhibited in institutional concert. This would also help the agent-based theorist deal with two 
further worries about how to disentangle those individuals responsible for sustaining an 
institution from those who are not, and to what extent some individuals who no longer exist 
were responsible for the way some institution operates now (and if so, what their motives 
were and how they are exhibited or reflected). 
The aggregative and emergent motivation strategy, then, may allow us to infer a kind of 
collective basic virtuous motive from individuals’ institutionally affected virtuous motives. 
But in doing so it raises a further damaging problem with attempting to obviate the 
particularity of this or that institution. Suppose that we could find the basic, aggregated and 
emergent motive of care or benevolence manifested in legal institutions, in institutions of 
local or national government, in those of the civil service, in health or medical institutions or 
in military institutions, for example. But now, stripped of institutionally directed qualities 
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specific to each case, what would it mean for, say, the ministry of justice to be evincing 
benevolence or balanced care, as opposed to, say, the UK National Health Service doing the 
same? Without some sense of what each different institution is doing or is supposed to be 
doing, we seem to have at best a very shaky grip on answering and saying what the 
manifestation of a virtuous motivation, in an individual or at the collective level, looks like in 
each case. To understand whether or not each very different kind of institution is exhibiting or 
reflecting its constituent individuals’ virtuous motivations in any sense, it seems we need 
some purpose or some value which those responsible can reflect on to exhibit institutionally 
relevant virtuous motivation at all. Thus the non-institutionally enriched interpretation of 
virtuous motives as comprising institutional rightness or justice, which does without this 
requirement, is consistent with agent-basing but implausible and uninformative.   
Of course the requirement that constitutive motives are non-institutionally enriched does not 
entail that these individuals responsible for some institution cannot look at any facts about the 
world and people in deliberating about what to do with respect to that institution. And the 
agent-based theorist could allow that institutionally relevant virtuous motives take into 
account certain values and facts about the world which, whilst not institutionally determined, 
are informative as to how one should act with respect to that particular institution. On this 
strategy,
 23
 those responsible for upholding legal or healthcare institutions need not look to 
features of those institutions as such, but are guided by the concepts or ideals of justice or 
health for which – we can reasonably assume – legal or healthcare institutions are instantiated. 
This way of understanding the rightness or justice of institutions in terms of motives allows 
that well-motivated individuals, or collections of individuals, can gaze out at features of the 
world and bring them into their deliberations about how best to instantiate a particular kind of 
institution, without their having to presuppose the institutional features they are seeking to 
instantiate.  
A weakness in this view, however, is that though it allows into the motivational picture the 
values and concepts which underlie the institutions in question, it does not allow into their 
deliberations the typically quite specific and concrete institutional interpretations of those 
concepts. So, the concept or ideal of justice might be considerable for the virtuously 
motivated individuals who are responsible for upholding a certain legal institution, but this 
itself won’t get us far at all in evaluating whether or not its working on a certain conception of 
procedural justice, or its jury selection criteria, or its adversarial system of trial – as opposed 
to other conceptions, criteria or practices – reflect or exhibit virtuous motivations (or fail to do 
so). This is because these are instituted features of a particular conception of legal justice, and 
its practices, which are not specified apart from a conception of that institution. 
Yet it is not clear that all or even any such concepts and values, ones that might appear 
coherently and rightly to figure in the agent-based theory of institutions, could be grasped 
without institutional concepts and values. For in many cases, questions of what comprises 
such concept may not be answerable without reference to the practices of institutions which 
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have shaped that concept. It may not the case that we can identify the concept or ideal as a 
relevant motivating condition or concept apart from the institution(s) that realize(s) it, because 
institutions inform concepts, and vice versa. Alasdair Macintyre makes something like this 
point using the example of education: 
‘How we categorize educational institutions and what norms define education for us 
cannot be separated. Equally, how we write the history of any particular educational 
institution will depend upon our judgments as to its continuity and identity; and these in 
turn will involve judgments as to generalizations about and norms governing educational 
practice. Normative debate is ineliminable from the question of how the concept of 
education is to be applied. The concept […] turns out to be essentially contestable.’24 
To this extent, well-motivated agents who consider these more abstract phenomena in 
weighing up actions in relation to their institution would need to include and presupposing 
some aspect of that institution in their deliberation, and the necessity of prior non-agent based 
considerations in the relevant individuals’ motivations would once again loom.  
We can recapitulate some key points of the preceding discussion by briefly and finally 
considering a slightly different way for agent-basing to conceptualize institutional collectives 
and their motives or quasi motives. A promising way forward might seem to be in averting to 
the subject of collective agents, as the bearer of those motives and characters, rather than 
individual agents. However, if there is or could be a successful account of group (moral) 
agency such that group moral agents could have motives, it seems that the problems discussed 
above would still afflict a group-agent-based theory of social justice. This is because, to recap, 
different kinds of social and political institutions embody some of their own distinct purposes, 
functions and social values. So collectivising the agency of institutions’ constitutive 
individuals would not yield an adequate picture of what it would mean for this or that 
particular institutional collective agent to have or evince virtuous motivations. Once again, 
what would it mean for the town planning committee, or army, or shadow cabinet, or high 
court of justice each to be caring or benevolent? We seem unable to answer by virtue of these 
groups of people being the same kind of moral agent, as we might with individual moral 
agents. If such institutionally defined groups are collective agents at all, they are very much 
more like individual agents with specific jobs to do, being bound by particular and specific 
obligations, than they are like the individual moral agent simpliciter. And here the problem 
that agent-basing has with specifying those particular and specific obligations – the job 
description – re-emerges at the level of institutional collective agents.  
4. A Problem for Virtue Ethics per se? 
In the introduction to this paper I said that Slote’s agent-based view offers a distinctly or 
purely virtue ethical form of a theory of political and social justice, where in order to be a 
form of political philosophy faithful to virtue ethics (as distinct from a view which gives a 
role to virtues in a political philosophy), such a theory needs to account in some way for the 
value or rightness/justice of social and political institutions primarily in virtue terms. Slote 
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gets this right but, as I have argued, the agent-based theory of social and political justice has a 
problem not so much with explaining the rightness or wrongness of individuals’ action in a 
social and political world, but with its key task of accounting for the rightness and justness of 
political and social institutions themselves. So if this is the case then we might wonder to 
what extent if any the problem in his account threatens to hamper any contemporary virtue 
ethical foray into political philosophy.  
I do not think that the problems I have raised mean that the first basic objection to 
contemporary virtue ethical politics per se – that there is a fundamental mismatch of 
individual and political matters – is a fatal one. At least, that mismatch does not seem 
hopelessly insuperable if we were to seek a variety of virtue ethics that applies distinctly 
somehow to political and social institutions and structures themselves, a distinct from 
individual agents. At the end of the last section we saw that collectivising the agency of 
institutionally grouped individuals would not avoid problems of the individual agent-based 
strategy, and that this is because of the specific purposes and functions that different 
institutions serve and maintain. This underlines the way in which institutions are not only 
collections of individuals oriented towards a certain goal or function, but are also social and 
political institutional structures, including rules, practices requirements, obligations and 
powers to enforce those requirements on individuals. These things are of course instantiated 
and sustained by agents, but they are not themselves agents who can bear virtues or evince 
motives of any kind. 
My own view in light of these points is, roughly put, is that that insofar as we can evaluate 
social and political institutions in virtue and vice terms, they are best conceived as structural 
and functional social artefacts – like social or political ‘tools’ – which bear virtues and vices – 
in the senses of excellences and defects – qua that kind of artefact, and from which role-
obligations and duties that bind individual agents stem. Institutional virtues and vices in this 
sense are appropriately quite different from the cognitive, motivational and affective traits of 
personal character, because they are not predicated of agents as such. This idea of course has 
its roots in the Aristotelian notion of characteristic activity – ergon – or function of a thing, 
and a notion of an institution being a kind of social artefact that is created for something: 
[a]ll associations come into being for the sake of some good - for all men do all their acts 
with a view to achieving something which, in their view, a good. It is clear therefore that 
all associations aim at some good 
25
   
Clearly it is doubtful whether some institutions – from criminal gangs to those of slavery – are 
aiming at any good at all except the perceived good of those who benefit from them. But 
recognizing bad, vicious institutions, and that we have good reasons to eradicate them, would 
also surely be part of such a version of institutional virtue theory, the point of which would be 
to specify what it is about which particular institution that makes its life qua that thing go 
well. Insofar as institutions are unlike people and more like tools, establishing the uses or 
functions to which we do and should put them does not seem an impossible or fruitless 
endeavour.  
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I outline this view a bit further elsewhere,
26
 and if it is to stand up then it will require 
development and defence elsewhere still. Here I mention it only as an indication of where a 
potentially socially and politically enriched form of virtue ethics should start. Certainly such 
an approach may not prove to be the best or only way to a successful political virtue ethical 
theory. Nonetheless I hope it exemplifies that such success rests not on extracting institutional 
values from the virtues or motivations of individuals, but rather on formulating a distinctly 
institutional variety of virtues. 
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